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For the last twenty years philosophers of an analytic bent have been fascinated by 
psychopathy and new empirical findings about it. This is a syndrome that is often 
characterised by egocentrism, shallow emotions, impulsivity, lack of remorse and 
antisocial behaviour that involves manipulating others and criminal versatility. 
Scientific studies of psychopaths have been used to argue in favour of philosophical 
positions or theories about the nature of moral judgment, motivation, and moral 
psychology more generally. Some authors have argued that psychopaths’ lack of 
empathy and guilt support moral sentimentalism, the position that normal moral 
judgment is grounded in human emotions and affective capacities (Aaltola 2014; 
Nichols 2004; Prinz 2006). However, this view has been challenged on empirical 
grounds by supporters of rationalism, the position that rational capacities are the 
essential prerequisites for moral understanding and motivation (Kennett 2010; Maibom 
2005; cf. Malatesti 2009). 
 
Philosophical investigations have drawn upon scientific research to frame responses to 
the social problems created by criminal psychopaths (Malatesti and McMillan 2010). 
Some philosophers have argued that neuropsychological studies indicate that 
psychopaths have serious deficits in capacities underlying moral and/or legal 
responsibility and thus should not be held accountable or completely accountable for 
their wrong doing (for a review, see Litton 2010). Psychopathy has recently also been 
investigated from a bioethical perspective (Jurjako, Malatesti, and Brazil 2018c), where 
the debate is ongoing about the justifiability and prospects for moral bioenhancement 
or modification of psychopaths (Baccarini and Malatesti 2017; Hübner and White 
2016). 
 
Philosophers have also weighed in on debates about the status of the construct of 
psychopathy. In particular, some have started investigating the mental illness status of 
psychopathy (Malatesti 2014; Nadelhoffer and Sinnott-Armstrong 2013; Reimer 2008) 
and ventured into investigating what type of category psychopathy is and how best to 
explain it (Brzović, Jurjako, and Šustar 2017; Hirstein and Sifferd 2014; Malatesti and 
McMillan 2014).1  
 
                                                 
1 For a bibliography of the literature covering these issues, see the entry “Psychopathy” on Philpapers 
at: http://philpapers.org/browse/psychopathy, edited by Malatesti et al. 
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This special issue of the European Journal of Analytic Philosophy aims to exemplify and 
promote advancements in several of these philosophical discussions. The selection of 
contributions was guided by the need to document how the landscape of the 
philosophical debates on psychopathy has changed in recent years. Many previously 
taken for granted assumptions are now being reconsidered and challenged from 
theoretical, conceptual and empirical angles. In what follows we will consider the 
principal dimensions of this change. However, before undertaking this task, we will say 
something about how psychopathy is commonly conceptualized in these discussions.  
 
Although there are various measures of psychopathy, the Psychopathy Checklist 
Revised (PCL-R), a diagnostic tool devised by Robert Hare (2003), has contributed 
significantly to crystalize the contemporary scientifically informed picture of 
psychopathy (Skeem et al. 2011). The PCL-R has contributed to the flourishing of a 
vigorous scientific research on psychopathy that is focussed on its measure, its 
behavioural and functional correlates, and its neuropsychological, neural and even 
genetic explanations (see the new edition of Patrick 2018).  Given such a prominence of 
the PCL-R in the scientific study of psychopathy, and most papers in this special issue 
presuppose familiarity with it, let us consider it in more details.  
 
The PCL-R consists of 20 items (see figure 1). On each item, a person can score 0, 1, or 2 
points, indicating that the trait does not apply to her, somewhat applies to her, or fully 
applies to her, respectively. Thus, the maximum score is 40. The PCL-R is often used as a 
categorical measure, where the pragmatic cut-off score line is placed at 30 in North 
America and at 25 points in many European countries.  
 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
Facet 1: Interpersonal traits Facet 3: Lifestyle traits 
1. Glibness/Superficial charm 3. Need for stimulation 
2. Grandiose sense of self-worth 9. Parasitic lifestyle 
4. Pathological lying 13. Lack of realistic, long-term goals 
5. Conning/Manipulative 14. Impulsivity 
  15. Irresponsibility 
Facet 2: Affective traits Facet 4: Antisocial traits 
6. Lack of remorse or guilt 10. Poor behavioural controls 
7. Shallow affect 12. Early behavioural problems 
8. Callous/Lack of empathy 18. Juvenile delinquency 
16. Failure to accept responsibility 19. Revocation of conditional release 
  20. Criminal versatility 
Items not belonging to any of the facets: 
11. Promiscuous sexual behaviour, 17. Many short-term marital relationships 
Figure 1: (Hare 2003) 
 
The prevalent opinion amongst philosophers was that psychopaths, due to their lack of 
remorse, empathy and inability to understand and conform to moral and social norms, 
should not be considered accountable for their pervasive antisocial behaviour. Besides 
philosophical arguments that were based on psychological and behavioural 
descriptions of typical psychopaths (see, e.g. Cleckley 1976), these opinions were 
reinforced by early empirical studies on how psychopaths fail to distinguish between 
moral and conventional violations, indicating that they do not possess adequate moral 
understanding (Blair 1995, 1997). 
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These arguments seemed to support the claim that psychopaths should not be held 
morally and/or legally responsible since they lack proper moral understanding and the 
capacities underlying receptivity to social and legally mandated norms of conduct (Levy 
2007; Malatesti and McMillan 2010; Morse 2008; cf. Shoemaker 2011). This prompted 
some authors to go so far as to argue that psychopaths might lack the prerequisite 
psychological capacities and moral capacities for participating in cooperative societies 
as full members with equal rights and duties (see, e.g. Gaus 2011, 210).  
 
Recently these views have been disputed on empirical and conceptual grounds. More 
recent empirical studies have not replicated the finding that psychopaths cannot make a 
distinction between moral and conventional violations (Aharoni, Sinnott-Armstrong, 
and Kiehl 2012, 2014). Currently available evidence indicates that psychopaths might 
have relatively preserved capacities for producing normal patterns of moral judgment 
(Borg and Sinnott-Armstrong 2013). These results led to a change in perspective, where 
some authors, far from thinking that psychopaths are not capable of grasping human 
morality, investigate the specific variations in the content of moral and personal values 
that psychopathic individuals might be prone to endorse (Glenn et al. 2017). On the 
more philosophical side, research indicates that psychopaths might well possess the 
relevant moral psychological judgments and volitional abilities and thus we cannot so 
easily exclude the option that psychopaths should be held morally and criminally 
responsible for their wrong doings (Jalava and Griffiths 2017; Jurjako and Malatesti 
2018a; see also Maibom 2008). 
 
Psychopathy has traditionally been conceptualized as a personality disorder (Cooke et 
al. 2012). In addition to behavioural and personality characteristics, neuroscientific 
observations of aberrant brain activation patterns have been correlated with 
psychopathy and these have been taken as further evidence that psychopathic 
individuals suffer from neurodevelopmental deficits that can justify considering 
psychopathy a mental disorder (Leedom and Almas 2012; Nadelhoffer and Sinnott-
Armstrong 2013). Viewing psychopathy as a mental disorder justifies investigating 
behavioural, cognitive or pharmacological treatments for psychopathy (Blair, Mitchell, 
and Blair 2005). 
 
This default view has been challenged from multiple perspectives. Some authors argue 
that psychopathic personality traits are socially or even evolutionary adaptive and 
therefore should not be seen as symptoms of a disorder (Krupp et al. 2012, 2013; see 
also Reimer 2008). In fact, unlike other major mental disorders, such as autism, 
depression, and schizophrenia, there are indications that some psychopathic traits 
under certain conditions might be positively correlated with evolutionary fitness 
(Međedović et al. 2017). In addition, it has long been recognized that psychopaths do 
not experience subjective distress for being psychopaths (Hare 2003). 
 
This might prompt questions regarding the legitimacy or feasibility of curing 
psychopathic individuals. For instance, if psychopathy is not what we would standardly 
consider to be a mental illness then we might wonder about the prospects for finding a 
treatment for reducing psychopathic traits (Maibom 2014). Or what would be a 
justification for finding such a procedure and applying it to psychopathic individuals 
(Hübner and White 2016; see also Baccarini and Malatesti 2017). Moreover, we might 
wonder how the mental disorder status of psychopathy affects questions of their moral 
and criminal responsibility (Reimer 2008). 
 
All of these issues about psychopathy become additionally complicated when we take 
into account the heterogeneity of the construct of psychopathy (Brzović, Jurjako, and 
Šustar 2017). The literature on psychopathy tends to distinguish between primary and 
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secondary, successful and unsuccessful psychopathy, sociopathy and psychopathy, etc. 
(for a review, see Skeem et al. 2011). The first distinction is often explicated in terms of 
anxiety levels, where primary psychopaths are low anxious while secondary are high 
anxious. Successful psychopaths, unlike the unsuccessful ones, are supposed to have 
superior rational and volitional capacities which might protect them from maladaptive 
behaviour or enable them to escape institutionalisation (Ishikawa et al. 2001). The 
difference between sociopathy and psychopathy is based on a difference in the 
aetiology of the two conditions (the first is sociologically determined while the second 
is genetically based) even though they may be characterized by the same behavioural 
and cognitive impairments (for a review, see Brazil et al. 2018).  
 
The heterogeneity of psychopathy is also exhibited in the fact that psychopathic 
personality and behavioural traits are not necessarily co-instantiated (Lilienfeld 2013). 
Moreover, they can differentially correlate with different neuropsychological tasks and 
measures. For instance, it seems that Factor 1 and Factor 2 traits of the PCL-R can be 
present to a different degree indicating that a person might score high on Factor 1 but 
low on Factor 2 and vice versa (Lilienfeld, Watts, and Smith 2015). In addition, different 
measurements of psychopathy correlate differently with neuropsychological tasks. In 
particular, Baskin-Sommers et al. (2015) showed that the interpersonal-affective traits 
measured by the PCL-R and fearless-dominance traits (which are taken to capture the 
same interpersonal-affective traits) from a self-report measure exhibit opposite 
correlations on a battery of tasks that measure different aspects of executive function 
within the same population of incarcerated offenders.  
 
All these issues have spilled over to philosophical or legal debates about the 
responsibility of psychopaths and foundational issues about the concept of psychopathy 
itself and how to measure it. For instance, some research indicates that there might be a 
difference between successful and unsuccessful psychopaths, where the first, as 
opposed to the latter group, are supposed to be characterized by better than average 
rational and volitional capacities which might enable them to stay below radar and not 
being caught (Ishikawa et al. 2001; see also Maes and Brazil 2013). If this is the case, 
then some authors argue that we should separately judge the responsibility status of 
psychopaths, where the idea is that while unsuccessful psychopaths might not be 
accountable for their behaviour, the successful ones still might be given their superior 
rational and volitional capacities (Ramirez 2015; Sifferd and Hirstein 2013; see also 
Jurjako and Malatesti 2018b). 
 
Regarding the foundational problems related to the heterogeneity of psychopathy, some 
researchers advocate turning to a more bottom-up approach to classifying psychopathy 
and more generally individuals exhibiting antisocial behaviour (Brazil et al. 2018). 
There is a wealth of genetic and neurobiological studies regarding the biological 
underpinnings and correlates of psychopathy and antisocial personality disorder (for a 
recent review, see Brazil and Cima 2016). Following the guidelines of the Research 
Domain Criteria (RDoC, Insel and Cuthbert 2015), the idea is to rebuild the 
classificatory systems of people exhibiting severe forms of antisocial behaviour by 
forming groups based on their genetic, neurobiological, cognitive, and behavioural 
phenotypes to enhance diagnostic procedures and devising appropriate treatments that 
might reduce maladaptive behaviour related to psychopathy (Brazil et al. 2018). 
Recently, investigations into ethical problems and benefits of such an approach have 
been undertaken (Jurjako, Malatesti, and Brazil 2018c). Other researchers advocate 
adopting a more conceptual task to re-examine the concept of psychopathy and by 
doing a rigorous conceptual and explicative analysis to capture the essential features of 
psychopathy and provide proper grounds for building a valid measure of it (see, e.g. 
Cooke et al. 2012). 
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This special issue presents an interdisciplinary effort to address some of these central 
recent challenges for the philosophical investigation of psychopathy. In the first three 
articles the authors address the foundational issues on the concept of psychopathy and 
its measurement. In the other three articles, the authors discuss the philosophical and 
practical implications of scientific study of psychopathy. 
 
David Cooke in his paper “Psychopathic personality disorder: Capturing an elusive 
concept” reflects on the problem of how to define and measure “psychopathy”. 
Describing someone as a psychopath can have important legal, social, and clinical 
consequences for that person. Given the social relevance of this concept, it is important 
to be clear about what the defining features of psychopathy are and how to properly 
operationalize it in scientific research. Cooke emphasizes that this problem has not 
been resolved because of the various conceptualizations and operationalisations of 
psychopathy in the literature. More importantly, the lack of clarity on the concept of 
psychopathy has, according to Cooke, often led to the confusion between the concept 
and measures of psychopathy. Cooke emphasizes that these two things must be kept 
distinct, and that a path towards developing reliable and valid operationalisations of 
psychopathy is to develop a clear concept of it. The solution that Cooke proposes is to go 
back to the basics, so to say, and develop a concept map of psychopathy. Cooke and 
colleagues named this concept map the Comprehensive Assessment of Psychopathic 
Personality (CAPP). Cooke provides an overview of considerations supporting the 
content validity of CAPP and discusses how it can be operationalized in scientific 
research.  
 
In his contribution “False-positives in psychopathy assessment: Proposing theory-
driven exclusion criteria in research sampling”, Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen addresses, 
from a philosophical perspective, the foundational issue of how to develop adequate 
procedures for measuring psychopathy. The research on psychopathy is fraught with 
mixed results about many issues that have been relevant for philosophical discussions. 
Rosenberg Larsen notes that even studies of profound deficits in moral understanding 
and the capacities underlying moral judgment, once thought to be defining features of 
psychopathy, have not been corroborated (or have even been disproved) by the latest 
scientific research. There is more than one explanation for these inconsistencies in the 
psychopathy research. Rosenberg Larsen considers the possibility that widely used 
measures of psychopathy contain diagnostic criteria that are too inclusive. If this is the 
case, then many samples would be contaminated with false-positives, i.e. people who 
are not psychopaths would be wrongfully categorized as such and included in research 
samples. Thus, the hypothesized (moral) deficits that real psychopaths supposedly have 
would then be difficult to detect due to the generated false-positives. To remedy this 
problem, Rosenberg Larsen proposes to use “theory-driven exclusion criteria” to 
develop more precise sampling procedures. Exclusion criteria refer to features that a 
subject participating in a clinical study cannot have. To develop appropriate exclusion 
criteria for studies on psychopaths, Rosenberg Larsen turns to foundational issues 
related to characterizing the essential features of psychopathy. He finds such features to 
be based upon deficits in the moral psychology of psychopaths. Based on these moral 
deficits, he discusses how sampling in scientific research on psychopathy might be 
improved.  
 
Janko Međedović, Tara Bulut, Drago Savić, and Nikola Đuričić in their contribution 
“Delineating psychopathy from cognitive empathy: The case of Psychopathic 
Personality Traits Scale” weigh in on the debate regarding the concept of psychopathy. 
Among other things, there is an ongoing debate about whether the antisocial 
characteristics, as described by, for instance, Factor 2 of the PCL-R, should be thought of 
as capturing core features of psychopathy or just representing correlates or even some 
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causal consequences of other core psychopathic traits. Međedović and colleagues 
discuss Psychopathic Personality Traits Scale (PPTS), a new conceptualisation of 
psychopathy according to which antisocial traits do not represent core features of 
psychopathy. PPTS is built on the presupposition that only Factor 1 of the PCL-R 
captures the core psychopathic traits, and thus it dispenses with the behavioural traits 
as captured by Factor 2 of the PCL-R. 
 
According to PPTS, psychopathy is characterized by four broad features: affective 
responsiveness, cognitive responsiveness, interpersonal manipulation, and 
egocentricity. The main aim of Međedović et al.’s study is to test the psychometric 
features of PPTS. They note that what is here labelled as “cognitive responsiveness” and 
refers to the “inability to understand the emotional states of others” is usually not 
conceptualized as one of the core features of psychopathy. Indeed, their psychometric 
study of PPTS shows that cognitive responsiveness correlates significantly less with the 
other three traits, than the rest of them correlate with each other. In this regard, they 
discuss the potential implication of their study that Cognitive responsiveness might not 
be a core feature of psychopathy. 
 
Heidi Maibom, in her contribution “What can philosophers learn from psychopathy?”, 
discusses the possible implications of scientific research on psychopathy for moral 
philosophy. She challenges some common assumptions that have so far underpinned 
philosophical reflection on the significance of psychopathy for moral psychology by 
focussing on the following key domains: empathy, decision-making, the proper 
conceptualization of impairments correlated with psychopathy, and whether 
psychopathy presents a unified kind. She argues that although empathy is often viewed 
as the core deficit explaining immoral behaviour of psychopaths that grounds 
judgments of moral non-accountability, scientific research is rather mixed and 
ambiguous regarding these connections. She argues that there are no conclusive 
reasons for thinking that psychopaths completely lack empathy or that they completely 
lack affective responses underlying our notion of empathy. Similar nuanced conclusions 
ensue regarding the decision-making impairments and other disabilities correlated with 
psychopathy. Scientific studies indicate that psychopaths exhibit affective and decision-
making deficits, but it is rarely warranted to claim that psychopaths in general lack 
altogether these psychological capacities. Some of the incongruities in the studies might 
result from the fact that the category of psychopathy is heterogeneous, comprising 
individuals with different personality, behavioural and biological traits. In this respect, 
Maibom draws on the scientific literature that distinguishes between primary (low 
anxious) and secondary (high anxious) psychopaths. She then investigates what are the 
philosophical, clinical and practical implications of this distinction. 
 
Anneli Jefferson and Katrina Sifferd in their paper “Are psychopaths legally insane?” 
discuss the legal accountability of psychopaths within the more general problem of the 
impact of psychiatric diagnosis on the legal defence by the reason of insanity. They 
argue that whether psychopathy is or is not a mental illness might be orthogonal for 
settling the question whether they should be excused from criminal responsibility. 
Moreover, they argue that given the heterogeneity in the construct of psychopathy, it is 
unlikely that there could be a reliable inference from a diagnosis of psychopathy to 
claiming that this provides grounds for the insanity defence. 
 
Erick Ramirez in his paper “Shame, embarrassment, and the subjectivity requirement” 
addresses the question of psychopaths’ moral responsibility. Ramirez situates his 
discussion within a family of reactive theories of moral responsibility. Many of these 
theories presuppose the subjectivity requirement, according to which to be an 
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appropriate target of ascriptions of responsibility one must have a capacity to exhibit 
and experience a range of morally relevant emotions and attitudes. 
 
Many in the past have argued that psychopaths should not be held morally responsible 
because they do not satisfy the subjectivity requirement. In particular, guiltlessness is 
thought to be one of the defining features of psychopathy. It could be argued that since 
psychopaths lack the capacity for experiencing guilt in response to their wrongdoing 
they cannot be appropriate targets of other people’s reactive attitudes and thus cannot 
be held morally responsible. Against this dominant opinion, Ramirez argues that there 
is a sense in which psychopaths might be held morally responsible even if we take for 
granted that psychopaths exhibit severe deficits in empathy and guilt. He distinguishes 
between several subtypes of psychopathy. Ramirez discusses studies regarding 
“successful” and “secondary psychopaths” who can understand and experience shame 
and embarrassment. This indicates that, at least with regard to experiencing morally 
relevant emotions such as shame and embarrassment, psychopaths can satisfy the 
subjectivity requirement. Thus, Ramirez argues that, to the extent they are responsive 
to shame-based norms, psychopaths cannot be completely exempt from moral 
responsibility. 
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